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3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	. 07-CR-543		
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6 7	RUSSELL DEFREITAS, KAREEM IBRAHIM, ABSUL KADIR & ABSEL NUR,			
8	DEFENDANTS,			
9		February 19, 2010 X 2:15 o'clock p.m.		
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11	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE DORA L. IRIZARRY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
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15	APPEARANCES:			
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3 THE CLERK: Criminal cause for oral argument, 1 2 docket number 07-CR-543, United States versus Defreitas, et 3 al. 4 (Appearances noted.) THE COURT: Mr. Ibrahim still has not been 5 produced? 6 7 I can give you an update. MR. HUESTON: 8 THE COURT: I'm going to ask everyone, please, for 9 these proceedings to remain seated, speak into the microphone 10 so that we can all hear each other. I think it was about two weeks ago I 11 MR. HUESTON: 12 asked him a direct question, when we could anticipate 13 Mr. Ibrahim brought back to the district. The BOP said it's a 14 security issue, which I understand. In terms of the treatment 15 issue, he's gotten better, he's gained more weight. He's over 16 105 pounds at this point. He's been in this sort of modified 17 confinement I described to you, out of the SHU setting, I 18 believe on anti-depressants at this point. The treatment, 19 what they're doing at Devens has worked. In terms of him 20 coming to the district, Mr. Miller and I were talking about 21 this earlier, that we wanted to contact the MDC. 22 What I'm concerned, brought it up with you before, 23 your Honor, about him being placed back in SHU. We think 24 that's going to cause his condition to deteriorate. We would 25 like to get MDC's position, given the fact he's not in the SHU

setting, he's fine. Perhaps there's a change of circumstances with respect to him that we can have a different type of housing situation or designation for him at the MDC. We're going to make that phone call after today's conference and see what information we can get on that.

Against the outcome of that, the answer if he's going to be put in the SHU, my viewpoint would be a latter date, have him return to the district later would be in his best interest. For trial he would be out for large portions of the day. If in general population, an earlier date would be fine. Once we find that, we'll be able to know which way we're going in terms of the fork in the road.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard with respect to that, Mr. Miller?

MR. MILLER: I would only add we communicated with the Devens facility, heard an update on Mr. Ibrahim's health very similar to Mr. Hueston's, that he gained weight, was in a better frame of mind; that they were pleased with his health progress. We were discussing how to proceed from here in the manner Mr. Hueston characterized.

THE COURT: I do have a concern about his getting the appropriate medical care since he has both a physical and a psychological component, and just recently we had a meeting, "we" meaning the judges of the court had a meeting with the new warden from MDC. They are suffering from really severe --

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not news to any of us who are working in the criminal justice system, particularly in this district -- that they are severely understaffed with respect to medical personnel and including the psychiatric component of that, in which case it's not just a matter of whether he's going to be put in general population or not, but whether they're going to be able to continue the type of care that he's been getting at Devens. Certainly we don't want any regression of his physical condition now that he's become more stable. The fact he's taking his medication is a big step by itself.

That's a concern. We had a concern that we shared with the warden that he was going to look to address, which is the situation where when prisoners are transferred from one facility to the MDC, about the continuum of medication and That's also something that's going to need to be diet plan. addressed. Perhaps the best thing might be for us to coordinate a meeting. I would like to be present at that meeting as well, and perhaps we can even get the Marshals Service to be present as well to discuss all of these matters with the warden and whoever on his staff might be appropriate. This way every single branch can express its concerns. Perhaps we can reach some sort of accommodation. Certainly as we get closer to the trial date, we'll discuss all of that, I think closer to the end of the proceedings today. We can perhaps work that out. We don't need to work that out now.

Maybe, Mr. Miller, you can check and see with Mr. Hueston and Ms. Dolan, and with my staff we can coordinate that. We don't need to take up everyone's time to do that today.

MR. MILLER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before we start the oral arguments on the motions, are there any other matters that the parties want to address?

MR. MILLER: The government would like to address briefly some scheduling issues to ensure we're all on the same page with respect to the trial date and the sequence of events pertaining to that date.

I believe the last time we were here we spoke about a trial date of June 1st.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MILLER: It's the government's expectation in a case such as this one, the jury selection process would be longer than your average case. In cases like this, as in the past, we've engaged in a jury questionnaire process, not to the level of a death penalty case with individual voir dires with the jurors, but questionnaires, a panel being brought in with additional follow-up questions at side bar if your Honor thinks it's appropriate.

At any rate in this kind of case, that questionnaire process builds additional time, two to three weeks before the

trial gets under way, and assuming your Honor is going to follow that general approach, we want to get a sense when the jury return date would be, when the questionnaires might be handed out and then when the trial might actually get underway.

THE COURT: I'm glad that you raise that issue because I was going to ask in the first instance whether or not, because I have no sense so far, whether or not the government was going to ask for an anonymous jury in this case.

MR. MILLER: Yes, I think we would ask for anonymous jury in this case.

that, given my trial schedule, I think we need to set up a schedule for that motion practice, obviously. Given the fact we do need to do that motion practice and then, as you say, even if there is no anonymous jury, I agree with you, I think the questionnaire process is probably the best way to go when we have a number of people involved here so that process of fine tuning the questionnaire, so on, given the length of the trial, we also need to give the jury clerk notice, at least 30 days advance notice so they can call in jurors at least 30 days prior to the beginning of our trial date.

Realistically, I don't think, given we're already at the end of February, given what I know to be my trial

schedule -- I don't know what everybody else's trial schedule is at this point -- I don't think June 1st is a realistic date.

Does anybody else have that sense as well?

THE COURT: There's a possibility, depending what I hear on oral argument today, that I may order hearings on the motions that have been made, at least with respect to Mr. Defreitas' Miranda issues, I don't think we disagree, a hearing has to be held, but we may need hearings on some of the other issues as well, and while I may be able to render some decisions up front with respect to some of the other issues that have been raised, I still would have to wait until we do a hearing to issue a decision on the rather extensive motions that have been made here by the defendants. That also has to be worked into the schedule.

Does everybody think that's reasonable? I don't think the June 1st date is reasonable under all these circumstances.

MS. MESSINA: My only concern is that other cases that I had scheduled might now have to be rescheduled. May I suggest we wait to see how today's oral argument goes and the court has a sense whether you'll be ordering anymore hearings and then speaking --

THE COURT: We have to build in a motion practice as well for the anonymous jury that the government has

9 1 indicated. 2 MR. MILLER: This is a motion --3 THE COURT: We're already at the end of February. 4 MR. MILLER: I would add we're prepared to file that motion quite quickly, a motion that is similar to motions 5 we bring in cases like this. While I can't speak for defense 6 7 counsel, in an effort to preserve the trial date, if that's in 8 everybody's interest, I think within ten days to two weeks we 9 could have that motion filed. 10 Speaking for Mr. Defreitas, we had MS. WHALEN: anticipated the jury selection process would begin on 11 12 We weren't actually anticipating testimony. We 13 were sort of, at least on our side, we were anticipating 14 things would begin that day. I don't know if realistically 15 June 1st, at least for the selection process, is feasible. 16 would think it still is, but I don't know. Can we have a second to confer 17 MS. MESSINA: 18 amongst ourselves? 19 THE COURT: Absolutely. Before we confer, on behalf of Mr. Nur, 20 MR. NOBEL: 21 we would oppose an anonymous jury application so motion 22 practice would be required on that issue. 23 I would also say, though the government has been 24 cooperative on the terms of discovery, that process is 25 continuing, I think it would be wildly optimistic to think

there won't be some issues, residual issues, that would have to be addressed as to discovery. I know I spoke with the government today about what expert witnesses they might be calling. That information is, again, the government is providing information, but it could be there would be a challenge to the expert that the government wishes to call.

THE COURT: We can, it seems to me, set discovery dates and motion dates with respect to that, have a schedule set up for that so that it's just not left dangling out there, even if it's outside what the Federal Rules normally say, given that there are a lot of issues here that have to be dealt with.

My concern is that, given the current trial schedule that I have, it's going to be very difficult for me to schedule some of the hearings. That's the only concern that I have, but that being said, there are other cases I have to try, one of my older cases and all four defendants have been incarcerated for a substantial period of time, whether here or in outside jurisdictions, if I have to move something, I will move something else to accommodate this case certainly.

MR. MILLER: While we're going over some of the hearings and other issues that will arise pretrial, the other one worth pondering is the CIPA process which has two parts.

The first part, we provided some classified discovery. If the defense -- we expressed our intention not to use any of that

1 classified information in our case. If the defense wishes to 2 use any of that information or evidence derived from that 3 discovery, they need to provide notice to the government. 4 Then there's a process for your Honor to rule on various 5 aspects how that would go forward. That's another set of issues that needs to be kept in mind as we devise the 6 7 schedul e. 8 In addition, although at this point I'm not certain 9 there will be, but there may be classified information 10 disclosed in 3500-type material. That's a process also that 11 shouldn't involve as much back and forth but could. 12 Might we have a moment to confer? MR. HUESTON: 13 THE COURT: Yes, certainly. 14 (Pause.) 15 THE COURT: Have counsel had enough time to confer? 16 MS. WHALEN: We have, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Is there some consensus? 18 MS. WHALEN: The defense team had believed jury 19 selection was going to be beginning on June 1st. 20 understand now that jury selection will begin a few weeks 21 before. They're amenable beginning the actual process on 22 June 1st, maybe sending out the questionnaire, resolving the 23 questionnaire issues the week before. 24 THE COURT: It's going to take us a substantial 25 amount of time to pick a jury, to go through the

questionnaires. We're going to need time for the attorneys to prepare the questionnaires, for the court to review it. As I said, I've already had cases I've had scheduled for trial now for months.

MS. WHALEN: We were also thinking if there had to be a delay, I guess we were thinking of two weeks. That wouldn't be a problem. The problems happen if it goes much further because certain attorneys assumed they would be giving the trial over to this case, had set up other cases and other commitments in September.

THE COURT: So has the court. I don't understand why if there are CIPA issues why that hasn't been brought to the court's attention earlier so that we could have started this process a bit earlier.

MR. WHALEN: Speaking for Mr. Defreitas's side, we don't anticipate given the discovery we've been given so far, we're not anticipating any CIPA issue. If it's 3500 material, we could set up a schedule for the delivery of the 3500 that would give us an opportunity to deal with the CIPA. I know I believe there are some documents the government is in the process of declassifying so there won't be a CIPA issue, but at this point from our side, I'm not anticipating a CIPA problem.

THE COURT: Are there any defense attorneys that are anticipating any CIPA issues that will have to be

addressed through motion practice?

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MS. MESSINA: For Mr. Kadir, anything from that room that we anticipate.

THE COURT: Anything else coming?

MR. MILLER: We intend to do a second 3500 analysis to ensure there's no classified material that would fall under that disclosure requirement which, as your Honor is well aware, generally is closer to the time of trial. We're happy to expedite that, do that early for the reasons Ms. Whalen appropriately suggested, so we could set an early classified 3500 disclosure date that would leave time to resolve any issues that might arise regarding how the defense wants to use that material at trial, but my sense is that material is going to be relatively minimal. If the disclosures are made, what we're hearing, the defense doesn't try to offer evidence from discovery that's already been provided in a classified form, that should do away with most of the CIPA problems in terms of schedule. It's a wise idea to set an early classified disclosure date to look at issues that might arise from that.

THE COURT: For purposes of any hearing that's going to be held on the motions that have been filed, while counsel were conferring, the earliest date I have available for a hearing is March 23rd. We could start at 10:00 o'clock. I have the whole day set aside. I also have some time on March 25th if for some reason the hearing spills over. For

14 now, the only hearing I foresee is the hearing with respect to 1 2 the Miranda issues relating to Mr. Defreitas. I may change my 3 mind after I hear oral argument on the motions today. It will 4 be a hearing on any of the issues relating to the case if 5 that's a date good for everyone. It is for Mr. Defreitas. 6 MS. WHALEN: 7 THE COURT: It may or may not affect the other 8 defendants. 9 MS. MESSINA: Fine for Mr. Kadir. 10 MR. NOBEL: That's fine. 11 MR. MILLER: We're available any time. 12 THE COURT: I tell you what I would like to do, I 13 would, once we get done with the oral arguments, we could talk 14 some more about setting up an additional schedule with respect 15 to any disclosures of experts, any discovery issues. I really 16 want to get to the meat of the matter and get to the oral 17 arguments. 18 With respect to the jury selection, we need to have, 19 if we're going to start -- I gather the parties want to start 20 with the jury selection -- the next jury selection would be 21 June 14th I have as an update. June 14th to begin with the 22 jury selection and then what I would like to do is to start 23 with the exchanges of the questionnaires in April to give us 24 sufficient time to review and so on. 25 MR. MILLER: Exchange between the parties, the

15 1 proposed questions? 2 THE COURT: You could submit that to me. 3 THE COURT: Shall we say by April 16th? 4 MR. MILLER: That would be fine. 5 After 16th to the court after we have exchanged? THE COURT: 6 Right. 7 (Pause.) 8 MR. MI LLER: With respect to the jury selection, is 9 the idea to hand out, once the questionnaire is finalized, 10 approved by the court, to hand out the questionnaire in 11 advance of June 14th, have reviewed it with an eye towards 12 actually bringing the jury in, selecting them on June 14th, is 13 that the idea? 14 THE COURT: Yes. We want to make sure we give 15 ourselves sufficient time, give the jury clerk sufficient 16 time, give at least 30 days advance notice, 30 to 37 days 17 advance notice, especially since we're going into the 18 summertime, people with vacation plans, kids out, weddings, 19 all that stuff going on. 20 MR. NOBEL: In reference to starting jury 21 selection, it's been my experience on questionnaire cases that 22 sometimes the government and defense have disagreements as to 23 people who should be struck for cause -- as a matter of fact, 24 every time. What we've always done is to identify places 25 where the defense and the government agree, identify places

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where we don't. By "place" I mean a stack of questionnaires. When the court indicates we would start jury selection

June 14th, do you mean that would be the day when we would address any identified areas of disagreement as to "for cause" challenges or would it be the court's practice to present those challenges as each is called out of the wheel? I'm not sure what your practice is.

The 14th will be the date in which the THE COURT: jurors come in. The reason why we want an off day, off regular jury selection day, is to distribute the questionnaires to the jurors on that day. We can have the jury clerk have half of them come in, distribute the questionnaires, half in the morning, collect those, get the other half filled out in the afternoon. Counsel will have then the rest of the week until Thursday to go over them, figure out where you have challenges, so on. Then we can meet on Friday because I'm going to set the schedule for the trial at that point. I will certainly be available to the parties. We can get together and discuss those jurors who have challenges, discuss how we want to proceed at that point. that acceptable to the parties?

MR. MILLER: That's fine. The system that you described is the one that I've engaged in previously. I think it's the appropriate system. Sometimes handing out questionnaires Monday, getting through them by Friday can be a

challenge, depending on the length of the questionnaire, number of the jurors. We're standing ready to do that.

My only concern is a logistical one. It usually takes from the hand-out of the questionnaires at least two weeks, sometimes a little longer to get the jury in place. By that point we're up on July 14th. My concern is that pushes the trial back. I didn't know -- I know there's an issue handing out the questionnaire on regular return dates. I don't know if it's possible to do that, hand out the end of May, the first two weeks of June since much of the work of going through the questionnaires is worth it. We can work with defense counsel on it.

If your Honor is otherwise engaged, perhaps we can wait until you're no longer engaged, but still save some time by not pushing back to June 14th. I know the scheduling is somewhat out of our control.

THE COURT: I want to check some jury return dates.

It's not here with the notations I have on the calendar. The

1st may not be a regular jury return day. If that's the case,

we can keep that date for the jurors to come in for the

handing out of the questionnaire, then have the jurors come in

for voir dire on the 14th.

MR. NOBEL: So I understand, you're proposing we pass the questionnaires out in the Central Jury Room on the 1st?

THE COURT: On the first. That would give the parties through the weekend. We could then meet on the 7th to discuss any issues with respect to challenges. We could also discuss at that point in time how you want to proceed with respect to questioning and so on. I don't want to tie up the time now discussing that. Then we could have the jurors all be told they come in on the 14th.

MR. MILLER: That seems to make sense to the

MR. MILLER: That seems to make sense to the government.

THE COURT: I am going to ask when you provide the jury questionnaires to use Word format.

MR. MILLER: Microsoft --

THE COURT: Microsoft Word. At the end of this my law clerk will give you the e-mail address so you could e-mail that to the court as well.

Remind me before we end, Mr. Nobel, you raise the issues to set a schedule for discovery issues?

MR. NOBEL: Very well.

THE COURT: Let's get to the meat of the matter.

I've actually been looking forward to oral argument on this case. I think the issues are quite interesting that have been raised by the parties.

What I would like to do, proceed as follows. Some of you have issues in common. Some of you do not. I want to begin by addressing some of the issues as they relate to each

individual defendant in the order in which they appear in the caption, just for sake of orderliness.

I read through everyone's submissions. Rather than just have you do as you might do in an appellate court, have ten minutes to state your case, I thought it might be more helpful if I threw out some questions about some of the issues that the court is concerned about based on the papers, based on the cases.

We'll start with Mr. Defreitas's motion with respect to the suppression issues relating to the statements and to evidence from the backpack.

Ms. Whalen, are you going to argue this on behalf of your client or Mr. Kamdang?

MS. WHALEN: No, I'll be arguing it, your Honor.

THE COURT: The court acknowledges having received the defendants' reply brief and the government had submitted a sur-reply since there was information contained in the reply brief that had not been there before.

The government's response is that with respect to the backpack, that because the defendant had been placed under arrest, it would have been the FBI's policy to seize the backpack, inventory the contents and therefore under the theory of inevitable discovery, that the items would have been discovered and are therefore admissible.

If the court were to accept that argument, would

that necessarily preclude a hearing on this matter? In other words, doesn't that argument moot out the issue with respect to the consent to search, the backpack?

MS. WHALEN: I don't think it does, given the affidavit that we received from Robert Addonizio.

Agent Addonizio, paragraph ten of his affidavit, simply affirms they asked Mr. Defreitas for consent to search his backpack and then Mr. Defreitas then gave consent.

In the case cited by the government in the letter they sent in arguing for inevitable discovery, United States versus Mendez, the Second Circuit said the government has to prove three things. First, the police had legitimate custody, that when the police in the agency in question, in this case it would be the FBI, conducted the inventory search, that they did so pursuant to an established or standard procedure and that the procedures would have inevitably led to the discovery of the challenged evidence.

I guess in the Mendez case they actually did follow the procedures for inventory search.

In 2006 in a case of the United States versus Heath, citation 455 F. 3d 52, 2006, that was a case where basically the police acted precipitously, later argued inevitable discovery would have applied. In that case the Second Circuit held evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion area rule only where a court can

find with a high level of confidence each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would have been resolved in the government's favor.

I believe while the government is legally correct that were they to establish that it was the FBI's procedure in this case to have conducted an inventory search had Mr. Defreitas refused his consent or not asked for his consent, then legally it would mooted it out.

My argument would be Agent Addonizio's affidavit makes no statement with respect to what the FBI procedures are, and not that I'm questioning Mr. Miller's -- I am questioning Mr. Miller's authority to put that forth. I think we need somebody from the FBI, either an additional submission from Agent Addonizio, but in the alternative, I would argue the better course would be if the court is inclined to grant a hearing on the Miranda issue where Robert Addonizio is going to have to testify anyway, the better course would be to have him testify subject to cross-examination as to policies of the FBI on inevitable discovery.

THE COURT: Mr. Miller, do you wish to respond?

MR. MILLER: Ms. Whalen has hit on the three prongs of the test. I don't think there's any dispute, at least not hearing any dispute the FBI came lawfully into the possession of the backpack. Had an inventory search been conducted, the items in question would have been found. If the issue is

crystalized, the FBI has a policy that when arrests are made, items taken from the arrestees must be inventoried, we can certainly put in an affidavit on that limited point or have whoever testifies at the hearing cover that within a couple of questions. I don't think we're really in disagreement here.

We're happy to provide that in either form.

We can talk about that, I could speak to Ms. Whalen afterward, see if an affidavit would be sufficient. If not, we're happy to have that witness testify to that limited point.

THE COURT: The other issue or question that I had is with respect, while I understand there is a disagreement between when the government says Miranda Warnings were administered, whether it was oral or in writing and the defendants' version when the Miranda Warnings were administered, and obviously we need to have a hearing to resolve that issue.

I suppose my question is the government has represented the Miranda Warnings were read to Mr. Defreitas from a statement, from a sheet that they have, a rights sheet, advice of rights sheet that they have. So that they orally advised him of his rights and then presented that document to Mr. Defreitas and asked him to initial it. According to the government's recitation of the facts, he read it, Mirandized it.

Aside from the timing issues, the defense has indicated Mr. Defreitas, said he was unable to read it. I suppose my question is to what extent -- if it is true as the government indicated that Mr. Defreitas was read the warnings, to what extent is it necessary for the defendant to be able to read the document?

MS. WHALEN: Your Honor, I don't believe that it is. I think the case law is pretty clear that if the warnings are given orally, there's no necessity for a follow-up in writing. We simply address that issue because it was presented to us as just a further affirmation of not only did we orally tell him, but we also let him read and see, he initialed here and there, therefore he clearly understood. It was just a response to that.

I don't think there is case law that requires an individual to be able to read the warning if they are in fact read to him.

THE COURT: I suppose what's a little troubling about the whole issue about whether or not Mr. Defreitas can understand what he was being given to read is to the extent that is an issue for the hearing, how the parties go about presenting evidence to that effect, I think that's something that the parties are going to need to consider to the extent that impasse on the issues that have to be litigated at the hearing. In that regard, the government, in

its replies, has made a request to be permitted to rebut the defendant's statement he was unable to read by submitting certain books or documents that were seized from his residence here in New York.

Do you want to address that for the limited purpose of the hearing? I don't think they otherwise intended to use that evidence; am I correct?

MR. MILLER: That's correct, your Honor. That also would apply if at trial were Mr. Defreitas to decide to testify.

MS. WHALEN: At this point I anticipated rebutting the claim that he could read through the government's own witnesses. I believe there were incidents that took place, especially with the informant in this case where it was clear to the government informant, at least, and I would assume clear to the government agents, Mr. Defreitas could not read, had difficulty reading.

I guess the other modes we would choose to have Mr. Defreitas testify as to why he might have these reading materials in his possession, yet be unable to read. I think we would address that at a hearing. I'm not anticipating, if the court is concerned, I'm not anticipating putting on the evidence of a psychologist or showing tests or anything to indicate brain damage or something like that.

THE COURT: I want to move on to the issue about

the evidence that was seized from defendant's residence in Georgetown, Guyana.

The first question for you, Ms. Whalen, other than the fact the investigation originated in the United States, at least based on the documents -- the record set forth before the court and the prosecution is taking place here in the United States. On what grounds are you asserting agency on behalf of the Guyanese officials or that it was a joint venture, to use the terminology of some of the cases specifically Maturo, one of the cases you're relying on?

MS. WHALEN: I'm basing on my view of the facts

MS. WHALEN: I'm basing on my view of the facts presented in the complaint and other documents. My understanding Mr. Defreitas was arrested here in the United States. The complaint was brought here in the United States. The other defendants were all arrested in Trinidad. For the Guyanese, on its face, for the Guyanese government to suddenly conduct a search of my client's home in Georgetown seems to me to be incredible unless there is some government involvement. While Agent Addonizio said United States agents did not participate in the search, as I said, simply not participating in the search, I guess I need a further clarification of what that means.

Does that mean they did not ask for the search but yet -- did they ask for the search but yet not go with the officers to the magistrate to get a copy of the warrant?

Did they ask for the search or did the Guyanese officials call and say do you want us to search?

Given Agent Addonizio's affidavit, there's no indication what not participating in the search means. We need additional clarification there.

I think also the bald facts what happened after the search, where they turned all the items over to the United States Government, did not keep them for any kind of investigation or further follow-up in Guyana indicates to me there was some sort of agency between the United States Government and -- well, the United States agents and the Guyanese agents. I don't know whether the court was aware of it, whether this was the police departments working together or whether the government is prepared to say no agent in the United States --

THE COURT: Which court was aware of it, the Guyanese court?

MS. WHALEN: The Guyanese, or whether the government is prepared to have Agent Addonizio testify under oath or in an affidavit, said no participation, he means no participation, didn't ask the Guyanese government to exit this search, the Guyanese police didn't approach them requesting the search and that this was something completely unforeseen, unrequested by the United States and simply an action with no link to the United States but for the fact the Guyanese turned

the evidence over to them at the end of the search. I think based on the affidavit we have, it's not clear and facially looking at the case, given none of the arrests were made in Guyana, that all of the arrests were made in other countries, and while clearly the complaint became public when the defendant was arraigned, it just seems odd the Guyanese would suddenly go in and permit a search of this individual's home.

THE COURT: I would like to hear from the government with respect to that.

MR. MILLER: The fact of the matter is the Guyanese I aw enforcement did act on its own. The government through the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice and the FBI didn't request this search be done. I endeavor to ensure before this hearing there wasn't a request from the government of Guyana for it is the government's position on a search. I have been told by some secondhand, happy to provide an affidavit on this point if the court would like one, but I checked into whether the people whose job it is from the FBI to liaison with Guyana, the Legat and the assistant Legat assigned to the country of Guyana, whether they have problems with the search in Guyana, secondhand the answer is no.

The reason is that happened, the government of Guyana became aware through the public filing of an extensive complaint which your Honor is of course well aware of and

extensive and detailed complaint the allegations Mr. Defreitas was involved in a very significant terrorist plot involving an attack on JFK Airport, and my guess is they took that very seriously as potential threat to the national security of Guyana, as well as the national security of the United States and conducted a search to ensure the safety of their own population occurs.

At any rate, when agents traveled to Guyana shortly thereafter, they were updated on the search, shown the materials seized during the search, assured by the government of Guyana it was a legal search, provided a copy of the warrant as well as the information underlying the warrant and the affidavit. They again were assured by responsible members of the Guyanese law enforcement community and government this was a valid search under Guyanese law.

As a result, as set forth in case law from the Ninth Circuit, the Southern District of New York, district courts in other circuit courts across the country, they weren't really in a position to engage in some sort of investigation of the Guyanese law and the Guyanese representations where they were presented with a valid search warrant inventory and explanation of the validity under Guyanese law of that search.

As a result, I think it quite clearly qualifies under the Leon good faith exception, even were there to be some mistake on the part of Guyanese law enforcement in the

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way they executed the warrant under their law. It would be anomalous, for example, for us to say here in the United States if a U.S. agent makes a good faith mistake under U.S. law in executing a warrant, obtaining and executing a warrant, that that's excusable under Leon, but it's not excusable when they rely on a representation of someone in Guyana where they know much less of the law, should be charged with much less knowledge of the law. Both under the joint venture analysis or the virtual agent analysis, whatever the terminology is that the circuit uses, under that theory, Guyanese law enforcement operated on its own in this search before it turned over the fruits of the search to the U.S. Government and the agents acted appropriately in relying in good faith on the representation of the Guyanese law enforcement officers that this was done according to Guyanese I aw. THE COURT: You mentioned the agents had gone to Guyana at some point. Had they been notified before that by the Guyanese government they had executed the search? MR. MILLER: My understanding the first time they became aware of the search was during meetings in Guyana a couple of days after the search and that it was a surprise to the agents the search had been conducted. That's my understanding of the factual situation. Within a couple of

days, I would have to get the exact date, but it was within

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two to three days of the search where the evidence was provided. I think I could get that for your Honor. within the government's submission. I have to find the appropriate point. The search warrant was executed, I believe, on June 6th. The hands-off of the materials was on June 10th. This is all in Exhibit F to the Addonizio affi davi t. I would note this also holds true with respect to two of the other searches that took place in Guyana, I believe only one of which is the subject of any kind of motion. That's with respect to Mr. Kadir's home, two searches of Mr. Kadir's home. I would note the second search of Mr. Kadir's home is on June 10th did take place at the request of the U.S. Government and with the joint -- that is a member of the JTTF accompanied Guyana's law enforcement agents when they executed that warrant. That's a slightly different scenari o. Ι. MS. WHALEN: My response to this, first, again, I would say there has to be some sort of supplementation of the affidavit put forward. None of that has been set forth that the search was conducted afterwards; that the government was not aware of the search. None of that was set forth, I believe, in the affidavit from Agent Addonizio.

THE COURT: Let's go back a little bit. Even if we

Secondly, moving on to the legal --

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were to assume for argument's sake that the government said Guyanese government, here, we have filed this complaint against someone who is a U.S. citizen of Guyanese origin, we believe he has contacts or residence or family members in Guyana. You may be interested in this. Let's assume that for argument's sake.

Wasn't the level of cooperation between the United States and the Turkish government in the Maturo case certainly far more substantial than certainly what seems to be involved here, even if it were the situation that the government even made a request for an execution of a search warrant, and in the Maturo case, the Second Circuit said -they held two things; that the Turkish police did not act in a joint venture with the Drug Enforcement Agency, with the DEA in gathering evidence through some electronic surveillance and there were some wiretaps that were involved there and in fact there was very extensive exchange of information that was involved there, the circuit also found that the electronic surveillance which was what was involved there, frankly, probably far more intrusive, did not have to comport with Fourth Amendment standards. It seems to me that was a fairly high bar that the circuit set in order to determine in the first instance that there was a joint venture between the foreign government and the United States.

MS. WHALEN: I agree that in the Maturo case

looking at the actions of the Turkish government in getting the wiretaps, I think in that case the U.S. Government clearly gave them information and then the Turkish government acted on it, but I think the thing that distinguishes the Maturo case from the instant case is that the Turkish government or the Turkish police agency went on to conduct a separate investigation. It was their investigation with an eye towards prosecution was conducted in Turkey where they did conduct wiretaps. I think in the end they turned the wiretaps over to the United States for a translation and even though those wiretaps wouldn't have been admitted in a Turkish court, I think they were using them as part of their investigatory measures or part of their investigation into the drug trafficking in turkey.

Here, there's no evidence there was any kind of investigation on the part of the Guyanese government other than the search. Clearly, the fact they immediately, or within two or three days of the search turned the items back over to the American government or turned over all the items to the American government indicates they had no intention of conducting an independent investigation.

While I agree Maturo set a high bar, I think the bar in Maturo was set so high because the Turkish government -- there was evidence the Turkish government was actually conducting an independent investigation based on information

that they may have originally received from the United States and gathered evidence as part of that investigation while the evidence they gathered might not have been admissible in Turkey, and while they turned it over to the United States that actually ended up using it, I think there it was almost clearer there was a separateness which was why the bar was set so high because the investigation, while they may have initiated from the same information, the U.S. Government turned over phone numbers to the Turkish government, or the police, and they investigated, I think it's almost the space between the investigations led to the bar being set so high.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for one second. Even if the court were to determine the Guyanese were acting as agents, virtual agents or in a joint venture with the United States, it seems to me under in re terrorist bombings of the United States embassies in east Africa, the second opinion from the circuit, which is found at 552 F. 3d 157, of the three opinions, the second opinion and the last one, the last one being which deals with the Fifth Amendment issues that were raised in that case. That decision is found at 552 F. 3d 177. For ease of reference, let's call it the Embassy-2 case.

The circuit there says in that situation the court then needs to determine whether the search was reasonable.

Then it also sets forth the test that the court has to apply

in order to determine whether or not the activities of the Guyanese officials were reasonable, and it requires a totality of the circumstance's analysis and it requires a balancing of the degree of intrusion into the defendant's privacy versus the need that is present with respect -- the needs to be met for the government under this totality case.

So, if that is the case and that certainly is how I read those cases and some of the other cases that were cited in the government's brief, and in defense counsels' brief as well, isn't the intrusion here, if you will, that was made at least pursuant to a warrant far less intrusive than the warrantless searches or wiretaps used in Embassy-2?

MS. WHALEN: Your Honor, my argument would be the warrant itself, the basis for the search was to look for firearms, ammunition, explosives. I believe, based on all of the information the government had at that point, they knew that Mr. Defreitas did not have firearms, ammunition or explosives and they knew that the individuals alleged to be involved in this case or the government's theory these people were looking for funding for such items, that they didn't have those items. I guess my argument would be, while there was a warrant, our circuit has not adopted the joint venture test which says you will look at whether the search was legitimate under local law. It says you look at the balancing test.

I would argue based on the stated basis for the

warrant, looking for these specific items, that the U.S.

Government clearly knew Mr. Defreitas did not have access to and the search confirmed he did not have access --

THE COURT: But the circuit said in Embassy-2 and held in Embassy-2 when you're dealing with foreign searches of U.S. citizens, that the Fourth Amendment warrant clause does not apply. What applies is the reasonableness. From what I'm hearing is that you're actually invoking these strictures of the warrant clause and the requirements of the warrant clause. A reasonable analysis looks to the totality of the circumstances and in that totality of the circumstances engaging within that analysis, engaging in that balancing test between the intrusion into the defendant's privacy and the needs that are to be met by the interest the government has to protect in engaging in that fact-finding or in that finding of intelligence, whatever the situation might be.

MS. WHALEN: I was not trying to invoke the warrant requirement. I was simply trying to respond when you said isn't a search with a warrant much less intrusive than a search without a warrant. My argument, what I was trying to say, was that it depends on what the basis is for that warrant. You can have a warrant that has absolutely no basis in fact that's much less reasonable than a warrantless search which may have a basis in fact, but I'm not seeking to invoke the warrant requirement.

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I agree the Second Circuit has adopted the issue of intrusion on an individual's privacy versus the need for promotion of legitimate governmental interests. trying to say, clearly the search of a home has always been considered a severe intrusion. In this case, balancing the search of Mr. Defreitas's home versus the government interest where the claim was made in the warrant, not that I'm invoking the use of the warrant, but the claim in the warrant was made to search for firearms, ammunition and explosives, my argument is that the U.S. Government, at the very least, knew that these individuals did not have firearms and explosives and I believe that the complaint that was filed, which was allegedly the basis of the Guyanese police search, did not clearly set forth the fact these were people looking for, allegedly, firearms, ammunition and explosives and unable to find those things, as much as the government knew.

What I'm saying is the intrusion of searching the home based on the promotion of government interest at the time the search was conducted, that in this case the balance would fall in Mr. Defreitas's favor of it being such a great intrusion supposedly based on a search for ammunition and explosives which the government clearly knew were not in his possession.

THE COURT: That was precisely the argument that was raised by the defendant in Embassy-2. The Second Circuit

in fact engaged in a rather long and detailed discussion about the argument, the specific argument that was raised by the defendant in that case, which was this was an intrusion into my home, and traditionally in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States, there is the sanctity of the home which lies at the core of the Fourth Amendment, freedom to be free from arbitrary intrusions into your own home.

The court goes through a very detailed analysis about the exceptions to the warrant clause and specifically in addressing the issue about the sanctity of the home.

In the end, the court ultimately decided that at least in the Embassy-2 case that the government's interest in protecting the security of the United States from terrorist attack far outweigh any intrusion into the defendant's home.

In that particular case there happened to be a warrant for the defendant's home in Nairobi. Mr. Miller, do you want to address these issues that have been discussed?

MR. MILLER: Your Honor has hit on the paramount interest and legitimate government interest in protecting national security and engaging in searches relating to homes inhabited by people involved in terrorist organizations, in terrorist plots that are targeting the United States as well as the Guyanese interests in the same national security interests down there.

The point I would make to add to what your Honor has already alluded to in the embassy terrorist bombings case, the court addressed a very similar search, the search of a home, a search pursuant to a warrant. In fact, in that case, the warrant listed stolen property as the subject of the warrant.

This listed firearms, explosives and ammunition, explosives of which Ms. Whalen just alluded to, the defendant was clearly pursuing. It did have a basis in the complaint which had been publicly filed; that is, they were pursuing explosives and perfectly legitimate for the government of Guyana and a government anywhere to have a legitimate government interest in figuring out whether indeed there were explosives at large within their community.

The point from the case law with respect to the specific idea if it says the wrong thing in the warrant that somehow that undermines the legitimate government interest or expands the intrusion. It was rejected by the circuit. The Kenyan warrant listed stolen property when in that case the Kenyan government and the United States Government, as I read the case, were not looking for stolen property at all, essentially a subterfuge, intentional subterfuge so they could go in, pursue their real interests, Mr. El-Hage's activities associated with Al Queda. The argument on the warrant would somehow undermine the legitimate government interest has been rejected by the circuit. As set forth in the government's

brief, many of the same issues, or I should say facts relied on by the court in saying the intrusion wasn't overly broad, was outweighed by the legitimate government interests are exactly in place here in this case. A warrant was executed as was in the El Hage case, executed in the presence of a family member in the El Hage case, in this case a close friend of the defendant's, executed, an inventory was left of whatever was taken. The same basic legitimate government interests are in place, interests in protecting national securities of the various countries involved.

I want to back up, Ms. Whalen said the United States knew he didn't have explosives. In any case like this, the government, any government is concerned about what it might not know; that is, these individuals were engaged in a pursuit of explosives and other materials which might allow them to make their attack a reality. There's never certainty in these cases. Again, it doesn't undermine the legitimate governmental interest of pursuing the evidence and instrumentalities of this type of terrorist act.

THE COURT: At that point in time, what exactly was the interest of the United States Government, at this particular stage of the investigation?

MR. MILLER: When the warrant was executed, as I understand it, the United States had notified the Guyanese government of the existence of the case and had notified the

Guyanese government of the complaint and the charges involved in the case. The Guyanese government then made its judgment without request from the United States to execute this search. At that point there was no mutual legal assistance treaty in place between Guyana and the United States.

As I said earlier, when agents of the FBI and the JTTF traveled down to Guyana, they were presented with the fruits of the search. So, saying exactly what the government's interest in a search that wasn't requested by the government is a little difficult, but had the government of the United States requested the search, assuming for the most there was a joint venture or that the Guyanese government was acting as agents of the United States Government, the legitimate governmental interests of the United States was protecting national security.

Here's an individual who would with probable cause has been provided and upheld by -- that is, signed and authorized by a magistrate judge in this courthouse, probable cause to believe he was engaged in a conspiracy to engage in a specific attack on JFK International Airport here in New York. The United States had a legitimate governmental interest in finding out everything there was to know abroad about that potential terrorist attack, to ensure we did know everything there was to know about it.

Just as in the terrorist bombings case, to use that

term, the embassy bombings case we've been discussing, in that case as well the government had an interest in learning what there was to know in that case a bigger organization,

Al Queda, its efforts to engage in terrorist attacks in the United States, just as in this cases the United States

Government had a legitimate governmental interest in figuring out what was going on with respect to this particularized conspiracy.

I think the terrorist bombings case is a perfect situation, sets forth legitimate governmental interests, find it paramount and important, especially when compared to the type of intrusion that was involved. Again, as I've described, the actions of the Guyanese government here track, in fact many ways less onerous than the actions of the Kenyan government accompanied by the U.S. Government agents in the search at issue in the embassy bombings case.

THE COURT: Do you wish to reply at all?

MR. MILLER: I would add Ms. Berger needs to go to another court appearance. She has to step out for 15 minutes.

MS. WHALEN: We're all in agreement as to what the applicable standard is, what the balancing test is. I think I would argue to the court more facts need to be alleged --

THE COURT: In terms of what, what additional facts need to be alleged and I guess as a follow-up question to that, are they facts that can be resolved by way of submission

of a declaration or incorporating it into the hearing that we've already scheduled?

MS. WHALEN: I think a declaration would be sufficient, simply to set forth what Mr. Miller had said here, that this wasn't included in the original affidavit. I don't know whether the declaration would come from Agent Addonizio, but were those facts to be alleged, the court would have enough information to perform the balancing test, make a decision. I think we're all in agreement about that.

MR. MILLER: I'm not sure -- with respect to the balancing test we're talking about, that balancing test is a reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment. I don't think there are any facts that need to be alleged or added to that balancing test. The only facts I understand that I've clarified would be facts relating to some agency relationship or lack thereof with the Guyanese government, but with respect to the reasonableness analysis under the terrorist bombings case, under the Fourth Amendment, that assumes the agency relationship. I think as we've discussed, as the government sets forth in its papers, this case is less severe or equivalently severe intrusion as in the embassy bombing case and identical, legitimate governmental interests, which overrides that intrusion. I'm not sure what facts I'm adding to that.

If the question is, if the court wishes some further

facts on the issue of agency, then I don't deem it necessary based on both the embassy bombings case analysis under the Fourth Amendment as well as the reasonableness of the agent's reliance upon the Guyanese law enforcement's representation that this was done lawfully in Guyana, but if your Honor wishes to have it on the agency issue, we would be happy to provide it.

MS. WHALEN: I misspoke. I understand it's a two-part test, first the court has to decide if there was an agency relationship and only if there's an agency relationship would you move on. My argument would be Mr. Miller has made a number of statements denying any kind of agency relationship. I think those facts should be put in an affidavit. What I meant to say, the court can make a decision whether to move on.

THE COURT: For completeness of the analysis, I think that would be appropriate. You can submit a declaration from the appropriate agent or agents that were involved. Given that United States courts have no authority to issue warrants in foreign jurisdictions, we can all agree with that. What procedures do you suggest the government should have followed here? What remedies should there have been given the fault that defense finds with the process? Forgive me if I'm not stating the question artfully. Given the deficiencies cited by the defense in terms of the search warrant affidavit

and so on, especially given the representation that has been made by the government that they had no input in the drafting of any search warrant, certainly not perhaps they would have been invited to make any necessarily.

MS. WHALEN: I would ask for the standards remedy under the Fourth Amendment, that it would be exclusion and to such a degree as the court found consistent with the faulted or intrusion if the court made such a finding.

MR. MILLER: This is where the Leon good faith exception is so important in cases of this nature where a foreign government is advising FBI agents abroad that they're acting lawfully under their law. To set up a scenario where the government of the United States risks suppression of important evidence gathered abroad if FBI agents in Guyana don't engage in law library analysis of Guyanese law to try to determine whether the warrant had been obtained by Guyanese law enforcement actually comports with Guyanese law, it's an absurd standard, unworkable standard.

THE COURT: It seems to me that's the reason why the circuit came to the conclusion that these foreign searches, whether it's of an American citizen or as they relate to American citizens because otherwise we get into the Verdugo issues, but really fall outside of the warrant requirement because of all the issues that were really pointed out in the decision in Embassy-2. All of the factors that go

into the historical basis for requiring a warrant to be issued before a search can be made particularly of someone's home are really absent when you're dealing with a foreign government that really has no interest in applying American principles to property that is within the confines of their country.

In footnote nine of Embassy-2, the court says, and I quoted "Because we conclude the warrant clause has no extra territorial application, we need not reach the questions of whether the searches at issue meet the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule."

So, they declined to even engage in that analysis and they also declined to adopt the reasoning of the district judge indicating the searches were permissible because the United States was not looking for evidence to use at trial, but only seeking, the primary purpose of the search was foreign intelligence collection. The Second Circuit declined to distinguish between the purpose of gathering evidence for use at trial versus simply gathering information.

Certainly, the deterrence factor which is inherent in the Fourth Amendment seems to be missing particularly where, as here, you have a foreign government saying we followed our procedures under our law. We assure you they were followed to the letter of that law. These search warrants were properly executed. Here's the stuff that we got. Certainly all the cases addressing these warrant

searches come to the same agreement that you can't really expect agents to be conversant in the fine nuances or even the general nuances of foreign law. It's exacting a standard that is not certainly reached, could be reached by any of the agents. I don't think there was a question there unless you want to comment about that.

I did want to discuss very briefly the issue about the search warrant and the Brooklyn apartment. This question is, Mr. Miller, to you. Why did the agents wait so long after Mr. Defreitas's arrest to search the apartment? It was over six months later.

MR. MILLER: The answer is there was a feeling initially that there was a lot of work to do and pressing matters to take care of and that this apartment was under lock and key, wasn't going anywhere. Then it was a matter of oversight for a period of months. In other words, right at the beginning, as we discussed, agents were traveling to Guyana, to Trinidad, were engaging a number of different efforts which were time sensitive, not frozen in time effectively as was this apartment. The apartment also was provided to the FBI and the JTTF by the city so that there wasn't an individual landlord asking the FBI to return the apartment at that time.

What precipitated the search was the city said to the FBI and JTTF, we need you to clear out of there and while

arguably the FBI could have simply taken all the items, inventoried them as is their policy and provided a list to defense counsel of the items and then as a matter of plain view and notice to whatever evidentiary basis there was to take possession of the materials that were evidentiary in nature, but rather than simply rely on that inventory, a search warrant was obtained out of abundance of caution.

What we have here is the FBI and the JTTF taking possession of those items at the time it became necessary to take possession of the items and then going to the step of getting a warrant to ensure taking possession of things of evidentiary value was signed off on from the court.

THE COURT: How do you respond to the defense argument besides the staleness issue there is no way to ensure that others didn't have access to the apartment? In other words, the integrity. What assurances are there the integrity of the interior of the apartment was not breached in any way by anyone else who may have had access to the apartment?

MR. MILLER: It was the FBI's having possession of the apartment, they had the keys to the apartment and it seems to me all the other possibilities that are speculative in nature; that is, no one had rightful access to that apartment other than the FBI and the JTTF. While we could speculate, it also could have been broken into by a burglar. All those things seem to fall into the category of speculation and

possibly arguments of certain weight of the evidence. There's been no suggestion any of that actually happened, that any of the materials involved were not Mr. Defreitas's or not the defendants. It's hypothetical, possible, someone could have gone in there, made an extra set of keys, but all seems hypothetical in nature.

As I said before, I think underlying all this is that the FBI and JTTF had possession of the apartment. It was I oaned to Mr. Defreitas through the informant, but when it came time for the FBI and JTTF to vacate the apartment, pass its control back to the owner of the apartment, the city, the FBI and JTTF had responsibility to take all those documents and items anyway.

So, the warrant was an effort to ensure all legal hurdles were cleared; that is, sort of belt and suspenders to ensure a court had signed off on the taking of those items, but ultimately if a warrant had been rejected or if the court were to determine the warrant of for some reason was defective for staleness, perhaps, although for the reasons set forth in the government's brief, I don't think those hold given the JTTF controlled the keys and access to the apartment, I think, again, all of this would be admissible and rightfully in the government's possession under combination of inevitable discovery and the inventory requirement.

THE COURT: Do you wish to respond?

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I guess the way I view it is that the MS. WHALEN: government, who gave this apartment to Mr. Defreitas, whether or not in fact it belongs to New York City, I think that does make the warrant requirement a necessity. Thinking on it now, the government may be right in that it may turn out to be more of a chain of custody issue in that while the government is saying only the FBI had access to the apartment, upon information and belief the keys were given to Mr. Defreitas by the informant, so there's an issue of whether the informant had an opportunity to make a copy of the keys, but more importantly, it would be the issue of whether New York City continued to keep a copy of the keys or whether there were fresh keys made or fresh locks made for the apartment when the FBI took it over. In effect it may be more of an issue of admissibility and chain of custody.

THE COURT: Chain of custody goes to weight as opposed to admissibility.

MS. WHALEN: I understand. I'm thinking this through now that it's been presented. The issue for us in terms of the warrant, I think clearly would be staleness. We had sort of argued about the maintenance of the keys, who had access in furthering our argument about staleness. I think our staleness argument still holds and the issue of who would have had access to the apartment or to the keys, if anyone, still holds. I'm not making a hypothetical argument that

clearly someone could have broken into the apartment, there were people who could have had access, but what I'm saying in terms of an institutional thing, if the government is claiming the apartment belongs to New York City, clearly would believe New York City would have some kind of access to the apartment. Their lack of access, I think, would have to be established in order to determine the warrant was not stale. I think the informant, there would have to be --

THE COURT: The government has already alleged only the FBI had the keys and access and if the city was asking the FBI to vacate, it sort of seems you can infer from that, it's logical to infer whoever it was from the city did not themselves have access to the apartment.

MS. WHALEN: Now that I'm seeing it, sort of thinking it through, I realize it may be more a chain of custody issue rather than a warrant issue.

MR. MILLER: My understanding, as any kind of landlord would, the city maintained the possibility that in an emergency they would need to go into the apartment. I don't want to misstate things. My understanding, just as in any landlord-tenant situation, if there was a fire in the apartment, the city is not going to say we can't go in there or burglar in the apartment or something along those lines. My understanding the agents spoke to members of the city, he had no record of anybody ever doing such a thing, but I want

to be clear about that.

THE COURT: Mr. Hueston or Ms. Dolan, I don't know who wants to address the court with respect to your client's motions.

MR. HUESTON: Ms. Dolan will be handling a majority of the motions, a Crawford issue, should be dealing with that issue.

THE COURT: Actually, that Crawford-Bruton issue has been raised, I believe, by all the defendants including Mr. Defreitas.

MS. WHALEN: We did not formally raise it. I understood the government was going to be providing us with Brutonized statements, then we were going to raise it if need be. I didn't raise it initially.

THE COURT: I actually did have -- withdrawn.

I find it more useful in addressing these Bruton issues if the court may ask for supplemental briefing, perhaps later on, from counsel who have raised the issue. I think in order for the court to be able to make a determination as to whether if there is a redaction or some kind of neutralizing of the references to the codefendants or Brutonizing, as the term has been used by the parties in their motions, if the government provides to counsel and to the court the original statement and the proposed redaction or Brutonized statement for sake of just cutting to the chase on it because it's hard

for me in a vacuum -- I could certainly look at the statements, perhaps if we substitute the person here, imagine, or individual there or whatever, but until you actually have the statements Brutonized themselves to compare against the actual statement, we're talking in the hypothetical and it's a little difficult to say you know what, there's absolutely no way that you can neutralize this statement to avoid a Crawford issue in the case.

So, I do want to hear the parties on the issue today, but I think we'll set a date for the government to provide that to the court and for any additional briefing by the parties with respect to that so that we have an ample opportunity to address that point.

Ms. Dol an?

MS. DOLAN: As we argued in our reply brief in response to the government's discussion of Bruton, it's our position Brutonization does not cure the Crawford problem here and cannot cure the Crawford problem. The reason for that is because the codefendant statements intertwine so inextricably with the nature of the charges and with the evidence that we anticipate the government is going to introduce in its case in chief based on those charges as well as based on the material in the complaint and we've set forth the various instances in which that occurs.

I don't want to go into that too much today unless

your Honor would like to hear more about that, or whether the court would prefer to wait until the Brutonized statements are before us so we could have a discussion then.

THE COURT: I think it probably makes more sense.

I really sat there looking at the arguments, looking at the statements. As I understand it, unless there are other statements out there, these are basically the statements, the affidavits that were made by the defendants in the extradition proceedings in Trinidad, correct?

MS. DOLAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Those were rather sort of narrative sort of stream of consciousness types of statements as I see it that were very specific in terms of the activities that were described or the actions that were taken by the different actors as it was described in those statements. I think that's true for all of the defendants, in fact. They were somewhat similar in terms of the structure that they took.

Let me hear from the government in terms of what Ms. Dolan has raised.

MR. MILLER: I would add we also would intend to introduce Mr. Defreitas's statements which were oral statements as opposed to written statements. That will be a slightly different Brutonization process. Up until this point we had provided each defendant's oral statements solely to that defendant. We'll circulate the oral statements to all

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parties and propose a Brutonization of those statements. I think what we'll do today or tomorrow or Monday, I should say, turn over the statements in their original form and then we'll provide the Brutonized versions of them according to your Honor's schedule. I want to put that on your Honor's radar screen. In addition to the extradition statements, there's, at least with respect to Mr. Defreitas, an oral statement we intend to admit as well.

Coming back to the argument, I want to put one more case on the record that came to my attention after reading Mr. Ibrahim's brief; that is, the first part of the terrorist bombings case, 552 F. 3d 93. In that case the defendant El-Hage argued the 34 page oral statement admitted against Mr. Odeh at the trial caused Crawford and Bruton problems. The circuit rejected that. Particularly they relied on the fact that Judge Sand at the trial instructed the jury that each defendant's post-arrest or other statements could only be used against that defendant and could not be used, for example, as in some of the other cases cited, to prove the existence of the conspiracy, one of the elements against all defendants. He took the approach that is now the one that's standard within the circuit; that is, an instruction to the jury each defendant's statements are only being admitted against that defendant and can only be considered by you, the jury, against that defendant. He gave that instruction and

the court said that alleviated any Crawford or Bruton problems when the statement was Brutonized against Mr. El-Hage.

That case, that's 552 F. 3d 93 at 136, there's also some discussion in footnote 36, I think is directly on point and we would have provided in sort of a sur-reply brief had we considered one appropriate.

THE COURT: Do you wish to address that, Ms. Dolan? I'm sorry to interrupt you. I know the argument has been made with respect to the Crawford issue that limiting instructions by the court have also been found insufficient in certain circumstances to alleviate the issue.

MS. DOLAN: In that regard I would sort of point a little bit more in the direction of Berger, 502 F. 3d 122. We do cite this, but I think Berger is probably more appropriate on that point.

The circuit dealt with that inquiry, basically one of the main problems in that case was that the codefendant's allocutions were particularly detailed, far-reaching. That was the reason the Second Circuit held the error was not harmless.

MR. MILLER: The only point I would make in Berger as opposed to in the terrorist bombings case, in Berger the court did instruct the jury it could consider the plea allocutions in that case as proof that a conspiracy existed which was proof against the defendant who was appealing. In

other words, they didn't get the same instruction that Judge Sand gave in the terrorist bombings case where Judge Sand said you can't consider this against any defendant in any way. In the Berger case they clearly said you could consider this against all defendants on element one, the existence of the conspiracy.

That's a critical difference for Crawford purposes. That creates possible prejudice whereas assuming the jury followed the limiting instruction which is the general presumption, when you give an instruction like the one given by Judge Sand, there is no Crawford problem because the jury is instructed not to apply that piece of evidence against the other defendants.

THE COURT: With respect to some of the cases that were cited by the defense, Becker and Riggi and Santos, it seems to me in looking at those cases, which I think all of them involved plea allocutions, there was a dual problem there. That was that not only did the court instruct the jury that they could use the statements not only against the defendant offering proof of the conspiracy, but also the government relied very extensively on those statements to prove their case. Riggi, especially where there were eight different plea allocutions of codefendants that were introduced into evidence and there was a substantial reliance by the prosecutor in referring to them, I suppose, perhaps,

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critical to what may be also relevant to the court's inquiry is to what extent the government has other proof independent of the statements of the conspiracy such that it would not be likely that a jury would be relying solely on these statements, whether they were Brutonized or not, on the issue of the guilt of the defendant.

MR. MILLER: As set forth in the complaint, the primary evidence will be tape recorded or audio recorded, I should say, conversations during which the government believes the conspiracy is essentially caught on tape in addition to testimony from the cooperating witness and others as to involvement of each of the defendant. Because of the instruction your Honor would give, if that's the sole evidence on some point, your Honor would Rule 29 the case because there would be no evidence unlike as in Becker, Riggi, in cases like that, at the time in the circuit the law was plea allocutions because they were made under oath in court were sufficiently reliable and had sufficient indicia of reliability they could be offered to prove the existence of a conspiracy. That was the law at the time.

That's not the law now. We would ask your Honor for the same type of instruction used in the circuit in the terrorist bombing case by Judge Sand. Under the instruction, the new law on out-of-court statements by codefendants, your Honor would Rule 29 the case if that was the sole evidence on

any particular element.

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THE COURT: Ms. Dol an?

MS. DOLAN: I have a few different things to say. What I think we can anticipate is that the government's reliance on the statements, whether explicit or implicit will necessarily be particularly or far-reaching for all the reasons I've already mentioned, all the reasons we already set forth in our briefing. I think it's particularly important in that regard to point out the complaint's reference to the Jamatt al Muslimeen in Trinidad of which the government alleges a shady organization, which is the best way to characterize it and because the statements intertwine with those allegations in the complaint, I think it's necessary to anticipate that they will intertwine with the proof at trial. That way, belatedly they would also necessarily bolster any cooperating witness' testimony as to those issues which I think we can anticipate, again, based on the charges and the statements in the complaint and finally, even assuming the statements did not intertwine to that degree, that type of limiting instruction, I think in this case, would require the jury to perform the type of mental acrobatics that are essentially Olympian. I just don't think it would be possible to craft a jury instruction that would adequately cure any problems arising from the degree to which the statements intertwine with the allegations.

59 1 THE COURT: Do any of the other defendants who have 2 raised the same Bruton issue wish to add anything to the 3 arguments that have been made by Ms. Dolan? 4 (No response). On behalf of Mr. Kadir? 5 THE COURT: No, your Honor. I believe Ms. Dolan 6 MR. NKRUMAH: 7 touched on most of the issues. I would like to add about 8 today about being informed about the statements of 9 codefendants, the opportunity to look over those. Again, we 10 believe those statements are going to be used in the 11 government's proof of the case, the allegations in the 12 complaint, we don't believe Brutonizing would adequately cure 13 the statements made. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Sam, you wish to address anything further? 15 16 No, Judge. Briefly, we adopt the items MR. SAM: made by Ms. Dolan, the same arguments. 17 18 THE COURT: What I would like to do at this moment 19 while we're dealing with this, if the government has indicated 20 by Monday you can provide the oral statements to all counsel? 21 MR. MI LLER: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: That would be by February 22nd. 23 MR. MILLER: Yes. 24 THE COURT: In their current original form. 25 MS. WHALEN: Those are the statements that are

60 1 going to be the subject of the hearing so if we have a 2 hearing, we wouldn't have to send this out to everybody. 3 MR. MI LLER: I suppose that's true. 4 THE COURT: I suppose that's true --5 MS. WHALEN: I have no objection to cocounsel 6 seeing them in advance of the hearing. 7 MR. MILLER: We had previously alluded in our 8 discovery letter to the existence of these statements. We 9 generally try not to pass the statements around other than for 10 Bruton issues, they're technically, the rules don't require 11 production to other counsel other than to precipitate a 12 motion. That's why we do that. We now reach a point we have 13 to. I appreciate Ms. Whalen's consideration in saying now 14 would be an appropriate time to produce those. 15 I would like to, just because we're THE COURT: 16 working with such a tight schedule, given everything that has 17 to be done to get the case in a trial-ready form as much as I 18 hate to create extra work for attorneys that are already hard 19 working enough. I think it's probably best just to do that. 20 When can the government provide their proposed 21 Brutonized statement? 22 MR. MILLER: Perhaps we could say two weeks from 23 Monday. 24 THE COURT: That would be March 8th. Provide a copy

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to the court, please, as well so I can start looking at them.

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                          Would you like a copy of the
              MR. MILLER:
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    statements on Monday or just the Brutonized version?
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              THE COURT:
                           What I would like is the original
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    statement that you're proposing, whatever the original
    statement is, including the oral statements and the Brutonized
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    statements.
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              MR. MILLER:
                             Both of you on March 8th?
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              THE COURT:
                           Both on March 8th, you could submit
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    that to me on March 8th.
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              What about any additional motions with respect to
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    those statements? Is one week sufficient?
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              MS. WHALEN:
                             That would be fine.
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              MR. HUESTON:
                             Two weeks?
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              THE COURT:
                           You need two weeks?
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              MS. WHALEN:
                             I forgot I'm on trial the week of the
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    15th so if we could also have two weeks.
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              THE COURT:
                           Are you going to be available for the
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    heari ng?
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              MS. WHALEN:
                           Yes, on the 23rd.
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              THE COURT:
                           That would be 3-22 for defendants'
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    motions and for the government to reply.
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                           A week would be fine.
              MR. MI LLER:
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              THE COURT:
                            3-29, a week for reply?
                           Yes, your Honor.
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              MS. WHALEN:
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              THE COURT:
                           That would then bring us to April 5th,
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I believe, correct me if I'm wrong -- I think all the defendants joined with the request for 404(b) evidence. At what point -- I understand the government's concerns with respect to perhaps some disclosure of that. At what point --

MR. MILLER: 404(b)?

THE COURT: Yes, 404(b) notice. I'm assuming for Brady and Giglio disclosures, those are being made on a rolling basis as the government becomes aware, given your continuing duty?

MR. MILLER: That's true --

THE COURT: With respect to disclose.

MR. MILLER: Certainly true with respect to Brady exculpatory material. Depending on the type of Brady impeachment material and the witness involved, we take the view, for example, rap sheets, things like that, we tend to turn over at a later point in our Giglio disclosures. The circuit has approved that practice as long as sufficient time is provided to defense counsel to develop that material as they need to.

With respect to Brady material, certainly Brady exculpatory material we're handing that over on a rolling basis. Giglio material, our general practice is most of that material we would turn over around the time we turn over 3500 material. In a case like that, it would be a few weeks in advance of trial with the exception, as we discussed earlier,

of setting up an earlier disclosure of any classified 3500 material.

THE COURT:

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What about the 404(b) motions? MR. MILLER: We thought we would turn that over about six weeks before trial, around the beginning of May if that comports with the court's schedule, and defense counsel schedule. It certainly seems to comport with the law.

MR. NOBEL: Just to address one point Mr. Miller makes, on the 3500 material because of the international component here, I would suggest somewhat earlier by several weeks release of 3500 material. Certainly any material that refers to aspects of the investigation that took place either in Guyana or Trinidad or some other foreign jurisdiction should be turned over at an earlier point than might be warranted than purely domestic information.

We could turn over materials for MR. MILLER: individuals who are abroad at an early stage, perhaps the same time, the beginning of May, turn over materials for any individuals in the United States on a regular schedule of a case of this nature, perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of three to four weeks in advance of trial.

THE COURT: That sounds reasonable. Shall we say, when you say the beginning of May, May 3rd is the first Monday in May. That would be for the government to turn over 3500 material, as you stated, for any witnesses that might be

outside the country?

MR. MILLER: Yes, your Honor, we'll do that for 404(b) material, our notice for 404(b) and 3500 material for witnesses located abroad. On that note there had been some discussion about the point of the possibility of overseas depositions on the part of the defense; that is, the government intends to bring any foreign witnesses to the country to testify in court so no depositions would be needed, at least that we're aware of. I hadn't heard anything since. As your Honor pointed out, that takes a lot of time to set up.

THE COURT: I'm hoping that everyone is going to say none are going to be needed because, as I said at one of the earlier conferences, this is something you need more than six months in advance of trial to deal with based on my personal experience with this issue. It's rather nightmarish.

MR. NOBEL: That time frame applies to witnesses whom you need for foreign jurisdiction in order to compel testimony.

THE COURT: Correct, Rule 15 depositions.

MR. NOBEL: I anticipate we might either have the question the witnesses be transported here or they be heard abroad; that they would be willing witnesses, not require the intervention of the foreign jurisdiction. At most it would require arrangements for a stenographer.

At this point we anticipate those witnesses would be

willing to travel to the U.S.

MR. MILLER: We need their names and identifying information. They may or may not be willing to come to the United States. The United States Attorney's Office doesn't control their admissibility in the United States. I've had situations in the past where the Department of Homeland Security has denied the admissibility of potential defense witnesses. I mean to address that. Then you might be in a position of having to do some sort of deposition.

THE COURT: I agree with Mr. Miller that that information is going to have to be provided to the government. I was personally in other cases had encountered that situation where the potential witness may have, unbeknownst to counsel, some immigration issue from the past that might prevent that witness from being able to enter the United States. Witnesses also have a tendency of changing their minds about their willingness to give depositions once confronted with the prospect of a stenographer and an attorney or attorneys gathering to ask them questions.

In terms of any kind of letter requests for any of the foreign countries, in particular Guyana, for any of these Rule 15 depositions if the intervention of the government is necessary, I'm afraid the time has passed in order to do that because they do not have, based on my painful experience with this process, they do not have a procedure in place for

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dealing with it. They are very, very painstaking in their requirements as far as what has to be submitted, but I certainly encourage -- I would suggest -- that counsel within the next two weeks make your decisions about these witnesses and provide the government with the information so that to the extent that you need the government's facilitation for these depositions, I assume these are depositions that the government is going to want to be a party to as well? Certainly, your Honor. MR. MILLER:

THE COURT: I encourage you to have that done by March 5th.

In addition, given the nature of such MR. MILLER: a deposition, we've been requesting since the very first discovery letter reciprocal discovery. That would be appropriate under Rule 16. If we end up doing depositions, reciprocal 3500 material, we haven't received anything, that's fine. We need, if there's Rule 16 material, that relates to any of these witnesses, we need to get that or 3500 material, we need shortly before the witness does a deposition. I remind the court and defense counsel of that.

THE COURT: Depending on what the parties have decided, I'm hoping the parties are going to be able to resolve that without the court's intervention. So far everybody has been able to work fairly well together in that regard.

Unless there are other issues raised by Mr. Ibrahim and Mr. Nur?

MR. MILLER: My memory with respect to Mr. Nur, there was an allegation the extradition affidavit he filed was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment.

MR. NOBEL: Would you like me to address that now?

THE COURT: I would like you to address that.

MR. NOBEL: Your Honor, I would submit this is somewhat of a unique circumstance in the sense that the arrest of Mr. Nur in Trinidad was at the initiation of the United States Government upon a bench warrant. That bench warrant was issued after the filing certainly of a complaint and my recollection of the chronology is correct, also, the indictment. Certainly the complaint was issued prior to the arrest warrant.

Ms. Nur actually surrendered, self-surrendered, I believe, June 5th after the arrest warrant was issued in Trinidad on June 1st. All of this activity was initiated by the government in the United States, all of it postdates the initiation of criminal proceedings in this district. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel clearly vested as of the time of the filing of the accusatory instrument which I believe was on June 1st or shortly before that.

The government seems to rely on the fact Mr. Nur had a Trinidadian attorney. I'm sure his counsel is very

competent as to the extradition proceedings of Trinidad, but the issue before this court is whether or not a statement that was made during the proceedings in Trinidad passes Sixth Amendment muster. Just because an attorney had been appointed to Mr. Nur on an entirely different set of proceedings, entire different situation and there's no reason to believe that attorney was aware of, was thinking of or knew of the potential for any statement being made in Trinidad would have on the proceedings in the U.S.

THE COURT: The Embassy-3 case, which is the third case that was decided by the Second Circuit in this line which is at 552 F. 3d 177, dealt with Fifth Amendment issues pertaining to that case. What the court made clear there is that the only time that the preclusion sanctions are involved where a defendant makes certain statements is where the defendant is compelled by the government.

There is some lengthy discussions in the opinion that if United States agents choose to interrogate foreign nationals that are held overseas and advise these foreign nationals of their Miranda rights, as we commonly refer to it, then, at that point, the Fifth Amendment applies. Here, there was no involvement by the government in eliciting the statements that were made by the defendants. This applies to all three defendants who were the subject of the extradition hearings in Trinidad and, in fact, they were represented by

counsel.

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I looked very carefully at the extradition documents, Mr. Nobel, that you provided attached to the motions you provided on behalf of your client. What I gleaned from those documents, in particular the ruling of the tribunal that ruled on the habeas petitions that were filed by the defendants in Trinidad, was that there was an initial proceedings before a chief magistrate judge who then decided the defendants would be held over for extradition to the United States. Then the defendants, with the assistance of counsel, submitted these habeas petitions and the defendants chose, together with their attorneys, on the advice of counsel, to submit those statements. Nowhere is it alleged that the government in any way elicited or compelled those They were voluntarily given by the defendants. statements. The government had no kind of participation in interrogating That's what the Miranda cases really are about. them.

MR. NOBEL: I was mindful of the Miranda cases which is why I moved under the Sixth Amendment.

THE COURT: I understand that. Even in the terrorist bombing cases, which is why I referred to that, there was no Sixth Amendment violation there. The court noted, the Second Circuit noted the government did not need to advocate or in any way be responsible for providing United States counsel to foreign nationals who were being held in a

foreign country.

How do you distinguish that case from this situation?

MR. NOBEL: To say there was no police-initiated questioning, I think, is to overlook the circumstances in which Mr. Nur found himself after, not at least initiated -- but the government initiated, procedures were initiated to extradite him here to the United States. To say there was no government initiation of the circumstances --

THE COURT: The government didn't compel those statements. The government didn't sit there and interrogate them, tell them you have to say this or you have to say that.

MR. NOBEL: The government compelled the circumstances where they had a choice, either to passively accept extradition to a jurisdiction that for understandable reasons Mr. Nur would view as hostile to his interests or to exercise his rights within the jurisdiction in which he was detained pending the proceedings of that jurisdiction that had been initiated by the government.

THE COURT: Could you show me a case, can you cite a case to me that says that the government has an obligation to ensure that a foreign national who is being extradited to the United States and wants to fight the extradition to the United States must ensure that counsel, United States counsel familiar with United States law must be provided to the

defendant; that the government has to ensure that

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United States counsel be provided to that foreign national?

MR. NOBEL: Taking the foreign national aspects of it out of the equation, I did cite cases stating Kirby, that the right to counsel vests, is created upon the initiation of criminal proceedings in this country. The government chose to initiate criminal proceedings, to use those criminal proceedings as a basis for extradition. This is not an onerous burden that would be placed on the government.

First of all, I'm not arguing the government, the United States Government was required to provide Trinidadian counsel for the Trinidadian proceeding. All I'm saying is that if the United States wants to use the sworn affidavits that are required in the Trinidadian proceedings, at least required in the sense you're going to try to make it meaningful in any sense of the word rather than just a proforma proceeding, so all the United States would have to do is walk into court, appoint counsel and counsel would never have to go, probably even might not have to go to Trinidad -maybe he would. Who knows, under the individual circumstances? At that point in time he would merely be advising the defendant of the existence of the United States proceedings with his knowledge of what those entail and to review with local counsel what the consequences might be if any action that the local counsel takes in accordance with the requirements of the local law as to the local proceeding.

That's not an onerous burden. In many cases it could be resolved in a couple of phone calls, but then for the government to sit back passively and to create a situation where those foreign proceedings are initiated and then not to take the most minimal step to provide either that counsel or the foreign national with the benefit of a counsel familiar with proceedings in this court after they've initiated proceedings in this court seems to me to tilt against the government.

Nobody says they have to provide a lawyer. The only loss they get is at the end they can't use the statements made in that proceeding they mandated by their actions from using those proceedings as a discovery tool in the United States proceedings where right to counsel is vested, but no United States counsel has been provided.

On one hand the government has all the ability and very minimal cost or burden to them to provide a defendant in Mr. Nur's situation, one with a pending United States case and pending proceedings in the jurisdiction in which he was arrested upon the request of the United States government, he has no ability to do anything. The United States Government with very little effort could see to it that those Sixth Amendment rights that is vested were honored. The only loss they suffer, they can't use an affidavit that was filed in the

local court in this case.

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THE COURT: Mr. Miller?

MR. MILLER: The case law and under the Sixth Amendment is clear, deliberate solicitation of the statements involved by the government. There's case law. The government cited it, cited in the government's papers, I believe where the defendant was arrested on a provisional arrest warrant on indictment as in this case. The same Sixth Amendment attachment argument that Mr. Nobel is making was made in that case that the Sixth Amendment attached because he was under indictment. In that case Mr. Rommy, unlike this case, with advice of counsel he submitted an affidavit to a court on the advice of counsel. In that case he came without his lawyer, I believe, who was in Spain, his extradition lawyer, and met with the DEA agents, then volunteered a bunch of statements. The court said to the extent he volunteered them, to the extent the U.S. agents didn't push him with guestions, that all those statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment because they were not deliberately elicited.

That case is far more government involvement than what we're talking about here where all the government did was comply with the extradition treaty by requesting a provisional arrest warrant, extradition request. There's papers the government was involved in more than that. The only involvement we had was request for extradition, responding to

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the Trinidadian lawyers for the Trinidadian government who asked from time to time for affidavits on particular points of relevance to the Trinidadian court. There was no further involvement of the U.S. Government in the extradition litigation.

THE COURT: From what I saw from the discussion of the judge who denied the habeas petitions, cited specifically to two affidavits that were submitted by Mr. Knox, which frankly the government was under obligation to provide in response to the extradition proceedings, it seems to me the government would be remiss in not responding. The mere fact the government puts in a response and otherwise complies with its obligations as it's required to do to ensure the extradition of a person who is wanted to answer for crimes in the United States, does not seem to me to be the situation that was addressed in the Sixth Amendment or Miranda cases addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It seems very clear from both the Rommy case that was referred to by the government and also an extensive Fifth Amendment discussion involved in the Embassy-3 case from the Second Circuit. That the critical inquiry is whether the government was actually directly involved in compelling the statements to be made.

I found it actually quite interesting that the arguments that had given the tribunal the most pause in terms

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of turning over the defendants to the United States weren't even the arguments that were raised by the defendants, but rather, were the amicus, raised in the amicus briefs filed from an Islamic organization, and there was another human rights organization that had submitted amicus briefs pointing out some current changes in the law in the United States in terms of dealing with terrorist cases, the use of military tribunals, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, torture, and so on, incarceration at Guantanamo Bay, so on. Those seem to be the arguments, frankly, that gave that court some substantial pause. I'm sure no offense to Mr. Knox, but they did not, the court did not seem to be too persuaded by the representation of the U.S. Attorney's Office acting on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States assuring, by their assurances the defendants were going to be prosecuted in a court of law and given the benefits of all the constitutional protections that any defendant who is tried in a court of law would get in this country. It actually required a representation from a diplomatic authority, from the embassy, to convince them. It seems to me whether or not those statements were

actually necessary, they were made voluntarily by the defendants who were in fact represented by counsel in Trinidad.

I see nothing in the cases, none of the court's

research has revealed any cases that require the government to go out of their way to provide United States counsel in extradition proceedings.

Every defendant who is involved in an extradition proceedings finds themselves in the same situation, either consent to be extradited or fight it. At a minimum, you hope they are represented by local counsel. That's the same process that's followed here when another government seeks the extradition of someone from the United States.

Unless counsel can provide the court with some case law that imposes that sort of duty on the government, I'm not persuaded that the Sixth Amendment rights were violated here.

MR. NOBEL: Just two quick points. In the Rommy case, the defendant chose to go, to initiate contact beyond those circumstances that were compelled upon him by the actions of the United States Government. When he asked to talk to the agents in the foreign jail in the hope he might be able to work out some sort of an arrangement, certainly there that had nothing to do with the proceedings or any proceedings the United States had initiated other than the most theoretical sense, filing the arrest warrant or initiating an arrest.

In this situation, the government is seeking an advantage from the participation of the foreign national in those proceedings available to him to fight the extradition

that's sought by the United States Government.

My argument doesn't put the government at any disadvantage. It just merely doesn't accord to them a further advantage other than obtaining the person for whom they seek extradition which is, indeed, the goal of the extradition proceedings.

They're not only not seeking the person, they're seeking to gain evidence in the eventual trial from the extradition proceedings. I don't believe they should be accorded that additional advantage. I would submit this is a classic Sixth Amendment framework or paradigm in that the compulsion comes from the fact that the foreign national is seeking to contest extradition, which is his absolute right under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.

MR. MILLER: I would just respond, the question here is whether the Sixth Amendment requires every time someone is arrested after an indictment they are then -- it's the government action in indicting them, obtaining an arrest warrant precipitates any statements made. We could easily have a system, perhaps Congress could create a system the moment there's an indictment, the court then assigns an attorney, so when the arrest happens in a case after indictment, there's an attorney present, it wouldn't cost the government anything, all the same arguments could be made.

That's not what the Sixth Amendment requires. It

says what the government can't do is interrogate, deliberately elicit these statements. The government didn't do that here just as in the context when there's an arrest warrant on indictment, the government goes to make an arrest, precipitated by that action, the defendant volunteers statements, perhaps trying to talk his way out of it as the Rommy case was, his goal was precipitated by indictment, subjected to extradition proceedings, hoping to figure a way out, judicial or extrajudicial.

When the defendant volunteers those statements -sorry, the Constitution doesn't bar the government from using
those statements against him. That's the Constitution.

Perhaps there could be a different regime created by Congress.

THE COURT: As to Mr. Kadir, last but not least.
Ms. Messina?

MS. MESSINA: I'll address some of the issues, although I have a sense -- I'm arguing on a global kind of theoretical position. I do recognize the case of U.S. versus Verdugo, VERDUGO-URQUIDES, 494 U.S. 259, 1990, did change the whole landscape of this, apparently. Let me frame the issues.

We're talking about what rights does a person who is not a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident have when stopped and searched in a foreign country? While Verdugo-Urquides seems to have a very particular positions on this,

almost means to strip the entire idea of the joint venture or virtual agencies doctrine that we already spoke of in relation to non-U.S. citizens, I would submit to you that courts are still struggling with this. I think this court should consider all the facts in this case before determining definitively the joint venture doctrine is mori bund in regards to --

THE COURT: The Embassy-3 cases all at some point, each one of the three separate opinions at some point or another cited to the Verdugo case, we'll call it that to make it a little easier for all of us, cited the Verdugo case and seemed to cite to in a somewhat settled way that a foreign national who with does not have any substantial contacts with the United States, as apparently Mr. Kadir does not, he seems to fit into that category, does not have the protections under the Fourth Amendment extended to him in a foreign country.

MS. MESSINA: I agree with that, but my submission to you is two things. One, I --

THE COURT: Explain to me why this case falls outside of the ruling of Verdugo, which seems to be the circuit very clearly has been following, at least referencing and reiterated the principles. Certainly it seems to be the law that is being followed in this circuit and there's been no overruling of it.

MS. MESSINA: I agree with you, Judge. What I'm

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asking you to do is consider a little more globally the issues here. I want to put this on the record, then I'll explain a secondary position which is that based on the intent of the exclusionary rule, and I think that's what we're talking about here, is that this very narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment and the article, the people, as opposed to people in the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the judges in Verdugo decided the people means only United States citizens or permanent residents. Justice Brennan had a real tough time.

No, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to try and discourage illegal police conduct no matter what US police conduct, no matter where it may occur. I submit to you that this issue will come up again, perhaps in a different formation of the Supreme Court, but other courts, even post-Verdugo have chosen not to cite it, or maybe to leave out the fact that the defendant involved, they left out the fact of inability. Perhaps it is consistent. I found cases since Verdugo, although not in the circuit that dealt with this thorny issue when there's such an operation conducted by U.S. police where they're the puppeteers, is it fair to then say they have no mutual obligations or obligation to uphold the standards of U.S. police that would have been upheld in this country merely because they're effectuating a search in another country against a non-U.S. citizen. I pose that as a theoretical basis for the court's consideration although I

can't contest your view on Verdugo.

THE COURT: What you're asking me to do in essence is ignore Verdugo, ignore the fact that the Second Circuit in Embassy-1, 2 and 3 cited Verdugo as standing for the same proposition and, in fact, used it to cite some of the language with respect to policy implications that were raised by the Supreme Court in Verdugo on the basis there are some other circuits that are grappling with it.

I'm certainly not in a position as a district court to change Supreme Court law.

MS. MESSINA: I understand that, Judge. I have a fall-back position which I would like to explain, although I want to talk about Verdugo on the record. That is in Verdugo, and the court stating it must follow that, there's language that if this stuff is going to happen, the place to control what happens overseas by our law enforcement is through treaties and agreements or through the laws of those other countries. I think it compels us to look at the laws of those other countries, what treaties exactly we had or have with the two countries that are involved here, which are Trinidad and Guyana.

I submit in particular we've heard a lot of discussion today about there being valid warrants for various things. I submit we're taking some of this, we're assuming what the government in those countries told us is correct or

we're making assumptions without having actual treaties in front of us. I think in relation to the Trinidadian stop it's clear American authorities transmitted information to Trinidad, they call it a provision arrest warrant, on which they acted. It was a U.S. arrest warrant on which Trinidadian police acted to stop my client, pull him off a plane.

On what basis, what treaty did they have the right to do that? I think the people -- the government -- has obligation to produce that if we know that such a treaty exists, what basis were they able to just accept a provisional arrest warrant from the U.S. and act upon it?

THE COURT: In the first place, this was not an argument that was raised in your main brief. It just seems to have been raised as an afterthought.

In the second place, it seems to me, and I'll let the government respond in a minute, that there was a rather lengthy extensive proceeding, extradition proceeding in Trinidad. I have to say I was very much impressed with the exacting and very carefully thought out opinion that was written by the judge who overruled, who denied the petitions for habeas relief.

One of the first few things he set out was this is what is required to be proven or to be submitted with respect to an extraditions request. He went through it step by step, made a record of what was provided by the United States in

support of its extradition request.

MS. MESSINA: I'm not arguing the extradition.

THE COURT: Except it was based on an arrest and information provided by the United States. It certainly seems to me, given the fact that the defendants were represented by local counsel who presumably were familiar with the extradition and laws and treaties of Trinidad, and who certainly seemed to raise a number of different arguments, all of which were ad seriatim considered by the court. That judge not only just considered what was presented based on his own analysis but also engaged, as we would, as judges here in the United States, in very careful consideration of relevant case law such as they would rely on from the United Kingdom and from Canada.

It was a very lengthy decision and very detailed.

It seemed to me that he did not miss a single point that was raised. In fact if, as I mentioned earlier, also raised the issues that were raised in the amicus briefs that were submitted on behalf of the defendants.

It also seems to me, given the serious concerns that were raised by the organizations that submitted amicus briefs with respect to the providing of due process to the defendants and protections of their rights, it seems to me even if the defendants' own lawyers did not pick up some deficiency in the process, that these other organizations certainly would have.

It seems to me there's already been a litigation about the extradition process, not only before one judge, the final judge who rendered the written opinion, but also before a chief magistrate judge who made the initial determination that the defendant's should be held over for extradition to the United States.

At this point I don't understand what is to be gained from relitigating whether or not the defendant's are properly before the court.

MS. MESSINA: I'm bringing your attention to a much smaller moment in time, the actual seizure, the moment when my client was seized and the right of the Trinidadian police at that point to take his luggage, to search his luggage and then to hand it over to the U.S. Government, particularly one electronic device is what I would like to focus on, called a thumb drive. I think it's important to know when was that device searched and by whom?

The computer seized from my client's house was shipped back to the U.S., searched pursuant to a search warrant in the United States. The thumb drive, it's unclear, based on what authority it was searched if indeed it was searched pursuant to Trinidadian law. That's unclear if an additional law or warrant is required to such an electronic device.

I want to point out to you it wasn't a new issue

what I brought up in relation to this having to produce a treaty so we know on what basis if it was a legal or illegal stop. It's in my response on path four, my response --

THE COURT: It was a reply. That's what I mean.

It wasn't made in your initial motion so that the government has not had an opportunity to reply. I'll give you an opportunity to reply.

MR. MILLER: There are four reasons we should not get to the issue whether arrests or searches complied with treaties. We obviously already talked about how Verdugo means there's no Fourth Amendment application to these searches or seizures. I'm not going to discusses that. It seems that would be time wasted.

The first reason we don't get into issues of whether these comply with treaties or not, the defendant lacks any standing to assert any violation of any treaty. It's been the law since 1884 a treaty is compact between independent nations, depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the governments which are parties to it. That's the case of Eddye versus Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 from 1884.

Basically that case goes on to say, unless the treaty itself expressly confers rights upon individuals, then the individuals have to rely on their governments to seek redress if there's some violation of the treaty. That case, that proposition has been cited repeatedly by the

Second Circuit including in United States ex rel Jan versus Gengler, 510 F. 2d 62 from 1975.

U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago do not confer rights on the citizens of those countries to seek redress under treaty violations except through the extradition process that it creates that your Honor pointed out the Trinidadian court exhaustively oversaw and administered proceedings to ensure it was followed. There's no standing.

The second reason is because the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to statutory or treaty violations unless the statute or treaty says they should; that is, the exclusionary rule, which as we all know is a disfavored remedy generally, is only applicable in extreme situations such as constitutional violations or where Congress has decided that the appropriate remedy -- it doesn't apply here because the treaties themselves don't provide for it. In particular, the mutual legal assistance treaty states in article one, paragraph four as follows. The provisions of this treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence.

The treaties themselves don't provide for suppression remedy. Courts have repeatedly applied this doctrine, that is, the doctrine that suppression is inappropriate remedy unless called for by the constitutional

violation or the statute or treaty itself. In the Second Circuit, in the Sixth Circuit, in most recently the Supreme Court applied the concept in rejecting argument that a violation of the Vienna Convention requiring consular notification and if that is not provided, suppressions would be the appropriate remedy.

The Supreme Court said it's not the appropriate remedy because the Vienna Convention doesn't require or authorize suppression as a remedy, Sanchez-Llamas versus Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 2006.

The second reason -- the third reason, these are not mystery treaties. They're available to anybody, cited by the court in Trinidad. There's an extradition treaty, MLAT available online. If counsel or the defendant thinks there's a violation of the law, they need to assert such violation in a particularized manner just as you would in any other case. It's not the procedure in this court to say there's a constitution, the government should justify the arrest doesn't violate the Constitution. It's the duty of defense counsel to assert a particularized violation that would warrant suppression and then for the government to respond. That hasn't been done here. The failure to assert a particular violation renders the motions or the argument meritless.

Finally, as your Honor pointed out, there was an opportunity to litigate the extradition. Frankly the

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underlying arrests also before the Trinidadian court. It's not appropriate at this point to relitigate relitigation the extradition or underlying arrest. Under Ker-Frisbie which basically says the manner in which the defendant was brought to the United States doesn't affect the court's power to proceed in the case. Again, the Lujohn (ph) case I mentioned earlier goes through that case Iaw.

For all those reasons, there's really no need for the court to engage itself in an analysis whether the arrests or the seizures complied with the treaties. All that being said, the arrest and searches very much did comply with the treaties, provisional arrest warrant requesting Mr. Kadir's arrest is what's called for under the treaty. In particular, the extradition treaty specifically authorizes seizure and surrender of property connected with the offense in article 13 of that treaty.

Second, with respect to the evidence obtained by searches in Trinidad, those were requested pursuant to the MLAT, Mutual Assistance Treaty pursuant to Article 4 of that treaty.

With respect to Guyana, there was no MLAT treaty at the time, but the Guyanese Law enforcement engaged in searches as we discussed already, searches they provided warrants, assurances those searches and the resulting seizures were made pursuant to Guyanese Law and provided materials to the United Article 4 89

States Government.

It's the government's position and the case law certainly backs this up that in a case like this where the person who is searched, property was searched doesn't have substantial contacts with the United States, is not either a permanent legal resident or citizen, there's no Fourth Amendment application to those searches.

With respect to the computers, it's the government's view, given the computers before they're searched had come into the United States, again taking a belt and suspenders approach, I don't think that the case law requires, we went and obtained a warrant because there was no reason not to obtain a warrant. The computers were sitting in FBI and JTTF custody in New York. Again, the government's theory there was while the case law in our view supports a warrantless search of that seizure that took place in Trinidad or in that case in Guyana, from a non-U.S. citizen without substantial contact, we could have searched without a warrant. The thought process was why not get a warrant, have a court authorize U.S. probable cause to conduct that search.

That's not waiving the government's position where evidence is seized lawfully abroad, provided by foreign governments that no warrant is required. Again, simply it's out of abundance of caution. For those reasons the court need not bother itself with whether the treaties were applied

Article 4 90 lawfully. I wanted to be certain to put on record the 1 2 treaties were certainly followed to the letter. 3 THE COURT: Do you wish to respond at all? 4 MS. MESSINA: No. This is the first I'm getting 5 this informations which I understand. The relationship the 6 thumb drive was searched here, wondering why the government 7 didn't obtain the search warrant as well. It's abundance of 8 caution you obtained one for the computers. 9 MR. MILLER: The thumb drive was searched by the 10 Trinidadian authorities, provided both the original and the 11 electronic contents. It stood in a different position from 12 the computers; that is, the electronic contents were provided 13 as opposed to simply the shell, if you will of the drive. 14 THE COURT: Anything further? 15 MS. MESSINA: No, Judge. 16 THE COURT: I thank you all for being so very well 17 prepared for the oral arguments today. It's really a 18 pl easure. 19 I think the one thing I left for the end today was 20 to set a briefing schedule for the anonymous jury. 21 MR. NOBEL: I have a note of discovery issues. Di d 22 that go -- perhaps for the government to inform us if they 23 have any experts, to turn over the Rule 16 materials on the 24 expert witnesses? 25 THE COURT: That we did not discuss. Thank you,

Article 4 91 1 Mr. Nobel. 2 With respect to providing the same schedule with 3 respect to discovery of expert witnesses that we had for the 4 Bruton statements? 5 MR. MILLER: The Bruton statements we were going to file by March 8th. We're still in the process of identifying 6 7 expert witnesses in order to provide not only the expert 8 witness' name and resume but also a summary of his or her 9 expected testimony or basic opinion. We need more time than 10 March 8th, perhaps the beginning of April? 11 THE COURT: I was going to suggest April 5th. 12 That would be reasonable. MR. MILLER: 13 THE COURT: For disclosure --14 MR. MILLER: That would be true for any defense 15 witnesses that weren't responsive to the government expert. 16 THE COURT: That will be reciprocal date just to 17 make it simpler. 18 We did discuss 404(b) notice to be provided by 19 May 5th. The government is going to turn over 3500 material 20 for witnesses outside of the country. I don't think we set a 21 date for witnesses who are going to be in the country. 22 MR. MILLER: We would normally do that if the trial 23 begins, the testimony of the trial June 14th time period, we 24 would say the middle of May. I don't know what Monday would 25 be there.

Article 4 92 1 THE COURT: May 17th? 2 MR. MILLER: That's fine. We set May 5th for --3 THE COURT: May 3rd for the 3500 material for 4 witnesses outside the country and also for 404(b) notice and 5 5-17 for 3500 material with respect to witnesses in the 6 country. 7 Would the government be so kind to also provide the 8 court with a set at that time as well? 9 Certainly, your Honor. MR. MILLER: 10 THE COURT: With respect in the event there are going to be any motions with respect to experts and so on, 11 12 since you're not going to know until you actually get the 13 disclosure whether or not you need motions, I'm going to ask 14 the attorneys if you are going to, once you receive it, if you 15 are going to file something -- I tell you what, ten days 16 after receipt, notify the court whether you're going to file 17 or if you're not going to file a motion. If you're going to 18 file a motion, just file it. 19 MR. MILLER: April 15th? 20 THE COURT: Correct. 21 MR. MILLER: We also talked about filing an 22 anonymous jury motion. 23 THE COURT: We haven't set the date yet for that. 24 MR. MILLER: With respect to the CIPA, I would like 25 to send a letter to the court, propose a schedule, review it,

93 Article 4 I'll send a letter to the court within two 1 have a sense. 2 weeks setting a proposed schedule after speaking with counsel 3 about it. 4 THE COURT: On the experts, if we can just go with 5 if anybody is going to file a motion with respect to the 6 experts, ten days after disclosure, another ten days to 7 respond and a week for reply. You could just assume to go on 8 that schedule, I guess, to make it a little easier. 9 For the anonymous jury, we have a lot of things going on here at the same time. 10 11 I would propose if it fits with the MR. MI LLER: 12 court and counsels' schedule, we file the anonymous jury 13 motion on the same day we provide the Brutonized statements to 14 make life simpler, have a number of disclosures on the same 15 day which is March 8th. 16 THE COURT: That's fine. 17 You're going to make your motion. Is March 22nd 18 okay for the defendants to reply? 19 MS. WHALEN: Yes. 20 Then 3-29 for the government's reply? THE COURT: 21 MR. MILLER: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Because the trial is still -- well, we 23 have the hearing dated on the 23rd. Since everybody indicated 24 that you're available on the 25th, perhaps we should use that 25 as a status conference date only because I'm then going to be

94 Article 4 1 tied up pretty much with trials in other cases. Is that good 2 for everybody? 3 MS. WHALEN: Yes, your Honor. 4 MR. MILLER: I won't be here for that. I have 5 every confidence Ms. Berger will be able to handle that. 6 THE COURT: March 23rd is going to be the hearing. 7 Right now it's just as to defendant Defreitas. I want to 8 absorb everything that's been argued today. What I will do is 9 I'll send out an ECF order so that everybody knows if there 10 are any other defendants that are involved in any other 11 hearings so the parties will know. 12 Also, I'll clarify as to Mr. Defreitas MS. WHALEN: 13 what issues the court would like to have a hearing --14 actually, Ms. Whalen said she was fine with a declaration from 15 your agent as to the communication to Guyana. 16 THE COURT: That should be fine. 17 MR. MILLER: We also intend to put in a declaration 18 with respect to the policy of the FBI in connection with 19 inventory searches and then perhaps we could discuss whether 20 that's sufficient. 21 THE COURT: You can confer then let me know. I'm 22 going to err on the side of caution. If Ms. Whalen does not 23 feel it sufficient, bring your witness, be prepared to have 24 that testimony. 25 MR. MILLER: I understand.

Article 4 95 1 THE COURT: Is 11:00 o'clock good for everyone? 2 MR. NOBEL: On the 25th? 3 THE COURT: On the 25th, a status conference so we 4 can make sure we're on board. 5 Just one more thing to remind you what's on your plate, Mr. Miller, if you could coordinate with Ms. Dolan, 6 7 Mr. Hueston and myself, MDC, a meeting about Mr. Ibrahim. 8 MR. HUESTON: I appreciate that. 9 MS. BERGER: Time for the hearing on March 23rd? 10 THE COURT: 10:00 o'clock. Everyone is good at 11 11:00 o'clock, March 25th, for a conference? 12 THE COURT: I'm going to have my law clerk give you 13 his e-mail address so that you will have it for purposes of 14 any of the submissions, so on. 15 He will e-mail all of you. That would be easier. 16 Anything else? 17 MR. MI LLER: No, your Honor. 18 (Whereupon this matter concluded for this date.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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